Dans la région du Sahel central, les Etats se mobilisent pour lutter contre les effets du changement climatique sur les crises violentes. Cette préoccupation est légitime. Cependant, pour trouver des réponses adaptées à la montée de l'insécurité, il importe de sortir de l’équation simple entre réchauffement climatique, raréfaction des ressources et flambée des violences.
Amid continued jihadist violence in north and east, fighting flared between competing jihadist groups and security forces faced allegations of extrajudicial killings. Jihadist attacks in north continued to spread southward in border areas between Sahel, North, and Centre-North regions, and westward in Boucle du Mouhoun region. Suspected jihadists 1 April attacked Toéni military base, Sourou province in Boucle du Mouhoun region, reportedly killing soldier; fifteen jihadists also killed. Also in Toéni area, military vehicle 3 April detonated explosive device, three soldiers killed. Suspected militants of jihadist Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 9-10 April killed at least nineteen soldiers in Solle area, Loroum province in North region. In East region, suspected jihadists 4 April killed police officer near Kantchari, Tapoa province, 20 April abducted another in southern Kompienga province near Benin. Security forces continued counter-insurgency operations, reportedly killing at least 36 suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants in Sahel region in April. Violence flared mid-April between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and JNIM after latter called on its militants to fend off ISWAP; clashes between militants 14, 16, 20 and 30 April in Soum province, Sahel region reportedly left at least 100 dead. Security forces faced allegations of summary executions of civilians. NGO Human Rights Watch 20 April said security forces 9 April allegedly killed 31 ethnic Fulani civilians during counter-insurgency operation near Djibo town, Sahel region; govt same day announced investigation. Govt 2 April said it would unblock $650mn to mitigate social, economic, and health impact of COVID-19 pandemic.
La prolifération des groupes armés et l'implantation rapide des jihadistes a conduit, en 2019, à une intensification de la violence au Burkina Faso. Le gouvernement devrait adopter une approche intégrée de la sécurité et mettre fin aux crises du monde rural en résolvant notamment la question foncière.
Face à la percée jihadiste au Burkina Faso, porte ouverte sur les pays du Golfe de Guinée, ceux-ci craignent des attaques sur leurs territoires. Les Etats de la région devraient améliorer le partage du renseignement, renforcer les contrôles aux frontières et renouer un lien de confiance avec la population.
Au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger, le boom aurifère représente une nouvelle source de financement, voire un terrain de recrutement pour divers groupes armés, y compris jihadistes. Les Etats sahéliens devraient rétablir leur présence aux abords des mines d’or et mieux formaliser l’exploitation aurifère artisanale.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Jihadist violence in the West African Sahel has now spread to the north of Burkina Faso. The response of Ouagadougou and its partners must go beyond the obvious religious and security dimensions of the crisis, and any solution must take into account deep-rooted social and local factors.
In a troubled region, Burkina Faso is a rare example of religious diversity and tolerance. But a perceived discrepancy between a significant number of Muslims and their low level of public representation has created tensions. To safeguard Burkina’s model of peaceful coexistence, the government must address this sensitive issue through careful reforms, particularly in the education system.
Burkina is a gateway to coastal West Africa and there is a real concern that jihadist groups may see it as a launching pad to gain other footholds in the coastal region.
In Burkina Faso, the intelligence system did not rest on an institution but on the shoulders of one man, General Gilbert Diendere. We know that some of the 566 soldiers have joined jihadist groups.
There is a strong sense [in Burkina Faso] that the state has never really done much for the north. [...] Strengthening its military presence isn’t enough – they need to establish trust.
The new rulers [in Burkina Faso] want to use justice when it serves them but they don't want to sink their own ship.
Justice is important for the Burkinabe, and the lack of justice and impunity is one of the reasons people rose against [Burkina Faso's President] Compaore.
Burkina Faso is suffering mounting insurgent attacks and social unrest. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2019 for European policymakers, Crisis Group urges the EU to support the return of some Burkinabé troops from Mali and to fund social programs that could ease discontent.
Attacks on the Burkina Faso army headquarters and the French Embassy on 2 March 2018 were better organised, involved heavier weapons and were more sustained than anything seen so far in Burkina Faso. In this Q&A, our West Africa Project Director Rinaldo Depagne says the jihadist assault further exposes worrying weakness in the Burkinabé security forces.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.